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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses whether employment termination has an impact on marital stability. 
Using discrete survival analysis techniques, we show that a husband’s involuntary job loss 
is associated with an increase in the risk of divorce by roughly 70 percent in the following 
period. The estimated relative risk of divorce is generally higher for involuntary job losses 
than for other types of employment termination. This result holds for both husband’s who 
remained unemployed after the employment termination as well as those who have found 
a new job. However, the relation appears to be short term, typically decreasing in 
magnitude after the first period and becoming insignificant in some cases in the second or 
later years (in a new position). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Marriage, Job Loss, Divorce 
JEL-Codes: J12, J63, J65 
 
2 
1. Introduction 
This paper analyses the influence of job loss on marital stability. The basic assumption in 
most of the economic theory of marriage and divorce is that, given marriage is voluntary, 
couples form and remain together if the individuals fare better living within the couple than 
they would otherwise (see e.g. Becker 1974a and 1974b)1. Job displacement has been 
shown to have a significant and potentially long-term impact on household income (see e.g. 
Jacobson et al. 1993, Stevens 1997, Eliason and Storrie 2006, Couch and Placzek 2010) 
which may reduce the value of remaining married compared to the outside option 
sufficiently to induce the dissolution of the couple2. It should be noted, however, that 
economists do not focus exclusively on pecuniary aspects when considering the gains from 
marriage. Becker (1974a) stresses that “the commodity output maximized by all households 
is not to be identified with national output as usually measured, but includes conversation, 
the quantity and quality of children, and other outputs that never enter or enter only 
imperfectly into the usual measures” (p. 310). In this spirit, job displacement may result in 
an increased probability of divorce for non-monetary reasons, including information 
updating regarding individual characteristics of the partner not directly linked to future 
earning potential (Charles and Stephens 2004) as well as stress resulting directly or 
indirectly from the employment termination. 
The purpose of this study is to test whether there is a relation between employment 
termination and the risk of divorce, and to quantify the extent of the relationship if it is 
present. To this end, we apply discrete survival analysis techniques on data from the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). 
Conducting this analysis is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, many studies in the 
field of economics investigate the impact of income shocks, job displacement or 
unemployment on a variety of outcome variables at the household level such as household 
                                                 
1 Most family economists would propose that there are some fundamental gains from partnership. Becker 
(1974a) focusses primarily on complementarities in the household production function, in particular 
regarding child rearing. Browning et al. (2014) provide a list of additional gains from marriage including the 
existence of household public goods and gains from shared consumption more generally, specialization 
according to comparative advantage and economies of scale in household production, solving credit market 
imperfections by extending credit within the family and sharing risks. However, they also note that an 
important role of the family is child rearing. 
2 Clearly, the theoretic analysis of marriage and divorce is much more involved than this gross simplification 
suggests, drawing amongst others on theories of optimal sorting, search and matching, bargaining and choice 
under uncertainty. Just as in other strands of economic theory, conclusions may change dramatically 
depending on the basic assumptions made in the various models. (see e.g. Browning et al. 2014) 
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consumption and labour supply by the other partner (see e.g. Blundell and Pistaferri 2003, 
Cullen and Gruber 2000, and Stephens 2002). Frequently this type of analysis is conducted 
on couples/families that have remained together, thus, eliminating couples/families from 
the sample that may have separated due to the impetus to be investigated. As Charles and 
Stevens (2004) have argued before, this leads to biased estimates if, as is likely, the impact 
on those who separated differs from the impact on those who remained together.  
Secondly, an increase in the divorce probability could also serve as an indicator for a 
variety of individual struggles brought about by the job loss, making divorce the ex post 
efficient solution. One would not expect any change under perfect insurance from external 
sources or within the family. Clearly, the causes of divorce are typically multifaceted. 
Nonetheless, the labour market shock and associated income reduction may serve as the 
trigger for a variety of interpersonal conflicts ultimately leading to divorce. 
Thirdly, divorce may have a direct negative impact on welfare. Since divorce is voluntary3, 
this proposition may appear surprising. Becker et al. (1977) argue in their seminal paper, 
that a couple “would separate if, and only if, their combined wealth from remaining 
married were expected to be less than their combined wealth when separated.” (p. 1144). 
This result holds irrespective of the particular laws governing divorce, but hinges on some 
crucial assumptions such as transferrable utility (see also Browning et al. 2014, chapter 6.5, 
and the literature mentioned therein). However, household public goods or the joy of living 
with a partner one still feels affection for cannot be transferred and there may not be 
sufficient funds in terms of transferrable private goods to induce the partner to remain in 
an otherwise efficient marriage. Zelder (1993) shows theoretically that the presence of 
household public goods can lead to inefficient (according to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion) 
divorces occurring under no-fault divorce laws and tests his theory empirically using US 
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)4. A second reason why divorce 
may be inefficient is due to the presence of (negative) spillover effects on the children, who 
are not an active part in the decision making process (see e.g. the meta analysis by Amato 
2001). While one might object that parents care about their children, it is not clear whether 
the parental utility function completely internalizes all negative effects on children. Lastly, 
individuals may also suffer from e.g. impact or projection bias in their affective forecasting 
                                                 
3 At least this is true for Germany, which is the subject of this study. 
4 González and Viitanen, (2009) also find an increase in the divorce rate in response to a change to no-fault 
divorce legislation in a panel of European countries. 
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(see e.g. Wilson and Gilber 2003, for a helpful review article on affective forecasting) or 
fail to anticipate long-term negative consequences more generally. In conclusion, while 
divorce is not necessarily an undesirable5 outcome in itself, there are also arguments that 
it may well be in some cases, besides being voluntary (for at least one of the partners). 
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence on the well-being consequences of divorce is not 
conclusive (Lucas 2005, Zimmermann and Easterlin 2006, Clark et al. 2008, and Gardner 
and Oswald 2006). 
Our study contributes to the existing literature on the impact of employment termination 
on marital stability by presenting new evidence based on recent panel data from Germany. 
We add to the literature by allowing a preceding employment termination to have a 
different impact on the divorce probability once a new job was found compared to the 
husband being/remaining unemployed. In a number of extensions, we also take a cursory 
look at which variables may help explain the overall effect and investigate the role of the 
wife’s labour market status. 
We apply survival analysis based on a complementary log-log model where the estimating 
equation is specified at the couple level, taking information on both partners explicitly into 
account. An involuntary job loss is associated with a roughly 70 % increase in the 
dissolution probability, which we interpret as the result of information updating regarding 
the quality of the match as well as short term stress. The estimated risk increase is even 
higher (154%) after one year in the new job. This may appear puzzling since having found 
a new job presumably results in a (partially) offsetting positive signal about the quality of 
the match. We argue that the overall signal can remain negative, which, coupled with the 
stress associated with starting a new job and potentially adverse characteristics of the new 
job, results in this larger increase in dissolution risk. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous 
literature related to job loss and divorce. The data and the estimation technique are 
introduced in section 3. Section 4 reports our key results. Section 5 presents robustness 
checks. Interpretation of our results as well as some limitations of our study are discussed 
in section 6, which also covers some model extensions. Section 7 concludes.  
                                                 
5 Subject to the normative judgement about what constitutes an undesirable outcome, such as by referring to 
the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion. 
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2. Literature Review 
The impact of unemployment and job loss on the individual has been documented in a 
variety of studies. In addition to the short-term earnings loss due to the current spell of 
unemployment, unemployment has also been shown to reduce earnings in the long-run (see 
e.g. Stevens 1997, and Arulampalam et al. 2001). Even after controlling for changes in 
earnings, job displacement and unemployment have been shown to have a profound impact 
on well-being or life-satisfaction (see. e.g. Clark and Oswald 1994, Kassenboehmer and 
HaiskenǦDeNew 2009 as well as Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998). The partner and 
other family members may also be indirectly affected by the job loss due to the reduction 
in household income6 as well as other (psychological) stressors7 (Nikolova and Ayhan 
2018). 
Kyriacou et al. (1999) mention unemployment as one of the risk factors for domestic 
violence. However, due to the data requirements convincing evidence on a causal link 
between individual job displacement and domestic violence within the affected family is 
scarce. Evidence based on local unemployment rates such as by Anderberg et al.(2016), 
albeit interesting in its own right, can only be indicative in this regard, because the 
“provocation effect” relevant for our study may be opposed by an “inhibition effect”, 
caused by employed individuals fearing to lose their job if they engage in violent behaviour 
(Catalano et al. 1997 and 2002).  
Stevens and Schaller (2011) report that parental job loss is associated with an increase in 
the probability of grade repetition, indicating a negative relationship between job 
displacement of the parent and academic achievement of the child. Oreopoulos et al. (2008) 
also show that children of displaced workers face worse outcomes in terms of lower 
earnings and an increased unemployment probability later in life. However, the effect 
appears to be largely restricted to low income families. In explaining the effect, Oreopoulos 
et al. (2008) highlight the importance of the reduction in household income, but do not rule 
out alternative explanations. 
Jointly these studies provide some indication that a job loss constitutes an important event, 
which may provide a negative signal about expected future earnings, personal 
                                                 
6 Stephens (2002) shows that labour supply responses by wives cannot fully compensate for the lost income. 
Furthermore, even if they did, the fact that the husband was working before indicates that this must have been 
the preferred arrangement. Taking the option to work away from the husband should not result in a better 
outcome for the family. 
7 See McKee-Ryan et al. (2005) for a meta analysis of studies investigating the impact of unemployment on 
psychological well-being and physical health. 
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characteristics of the partner and other aspects related to the quality of the match. This 
point is important in the context of Becker (1991) and Becker et al. (1977) who note that 
considering uncertainty in marriage markets is essential to understanding divorce and 
highlight the importance of information updating. Becker et al. (1977) also show that 
higher earnings lead to a reduction in the dissolution probability, which indicates that job 
loss could have an impact on divorce via the earnings loss. 
Using data from the PSID Charles and Stephens (2004) show that a partner’s job 
displacement, which may be indicative of negative personal traits of the partner, increases 
the probability of divorce while disability, besides having a larger long-term impact on 
earnings, does not. This leads the authors to argue that information regarding a partner’s 
non-economic suitability rather than the future pecuniary value of the match is important 
for marital stability. The impact of the job displacement is strongest in the years 
immediately following the displacement and does not appear to be long-term. The authors’ 
hypothesis is further confirmed when distinguishing between different types of job 
displacement. Layoffs have a significant impact on the divorce hazard, while plant closing, 
which should be largely independent of personal characteristics of the worker, do not. 
Doiron and Mendolia (2012) use discrete time duration models and British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) data to investigate the impact of job loss on couple separation. The 
authors distinguish between three types of involuntary job displacements: redundancies, 
dismissals and temporary job endings. Dismissals and temporary job endings are shown to 
increase the probability of divorce significantly while redundancies only have a small, 
frequently insignificant, effect. The authors argue that this result is due to redundancies not 
conveying new information about the partner’s characteristics and thus the future value of 
the match, while the person specific types of job displacement do. 
Eliason (2012) uses Swedish linked-employer-employee data to identify causal effects 
from plant closures on divorce risk. Although plant closures affect all employees of a firm 
irrespective of their unobservable personal characteristics, Eliason (2012) acknowledges 
that firms that run out of business are non-random. Consequently, he applies a propensity 
score weighted discrete time logit model. In contrast to the aforementioned studies, he 
documents an increase in divorce risk following a husband’s job loss due to plant closure. 
While the coefficient on the wife’s job loss has the same sign it is smaller in magnitude 
and insignificantly different from zero. Eliason (2012) argues that a job loss due to plant 
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closure does not only cause financial strain for the family but also acts as a major stressor, 
affecting social networks, time structure and identity of both husband and wife. 
 
3. Data and Estimation 
Our analysis uses the 1984 to 2015 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), 
a representative annual survey following the same households over time (see Wagner et al. 
2007, for a useful introduction to the SOEP). Each individual aged 17 or over living within 
a selected household responds to a personal questionnaire. In addition, the head of 
household responds to a household questionnaire. In our study, the couple is taken as the 
unit of analysis, rather than the individual. Each observation thus contains information on 
both partners, including their labour market statuses, as well as household characteristics. 
The sample is restricted to married couples. Thus, cohabiting couples and singles are 
dropped from the sample. By requiring both partners in the household to state that they are 
married (and not living separately), we also drop cases where individuals cohabit with a 
new partner while still married to another person. Furthermore, same sex couples are 
dropped from the analysis, because the unit of analysis is the household and explanatory 
variables are coded as information on the husband and wife. After applying these sample 
restrictions, 116,069 couple-year observations for which the relevant information is 
available remain. This covers more than 13,000 different couples. 
A household is defined as experiencing a dissolution if either the partners explicitly state 
that a divorce occurred in the previous year or the marital status indicates that the partners 
are currently separated (either divorced or married but living separately). 8  To avoid 
uncertainty about the timing of events, marital dissolution in the following year is chosen 
as the dependent variable. Another reason to not consider a contemporaneous correlation 
is that it takes some time for the dissolution to occur in response to the job loss, e.g. because 
it is necessary to find a new apartment. 
While the underlying process is in continuous time, i.e. a couple can separate at any point 
during the year, a divorce is only observed at the next yearly interview. Therefore, we 
estimate a discrete-time proportional-hazard model, specifically a complementary log-log 
                                                 
8 By German law, couples are required to have lived apart for one year before they can file for divorce. 
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model suitable for the analysis of interval-censored data. The general hazard function for 
the ݅௧௛ couple in period ݐ after the start of the marriage is defined as follows: 
݄௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ͳ െ ሾെሺߚᇱܺ௜ ൅ ߛሺݐሻሻሿ (1)  
ܺ௜ denotes a vector of covariates including information on job loss and controls. The key 
explanatory variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the husband has previously 
experienced an involuntary job loss at some point during the observation period and equal 
to zero otherwise. In particular, it captures job displacements due to plant closure or 
dismissal.9 Furthermore, we include a second indicator variable capturing all other job 
losses. Our focus lies on analyzing changes associated with involuntary job losses. The 
influence of other job losses is only of secondary interest, because the heterogeneity within 
this group complicates the interpretation. However, including this additional dummy 
variable in the regression is always necessary, even if the variable itself was of no interest, 
because doing so excludes men with any form of employment termination from the default 
category. Supplementary employment status variables (pensioner, inactive, self-employed) 
are included to ensure that the change in divorce risk is estimated relative to the subgroup 
of couples where the husband remained employed. 
Additional household level controls are house ownership, number of children, local area. 
We also control for the age at entry and educational attainment of both partners as well as 
the employment status of the wife. In an extension, we also allow for interaction effects. 
The baseline hazard is defined by ߛሺݐሻ, which is captured by a set of time dummies in our 
specification. Due to data limitations, it is not fully non-parametric. While we observe 
divorces at each marriage duration shorter than 40 years, and are, thus, able to include a 
dummy for each duration up to this point, some longer durations are missing. Therefore, 
we assume a constant baseline hazard for each of the periods from 40 to 50, 50 to 60 and 
after 60 years. 
In total, we observe 9,517 employment terminations, of which 1,526 are due to dismissal 
or plant closure i.e. “involuntary”. The remaining 7,991 employment terminations are due 
to other reasons. We also observe 791 divorces. Comparing the total number of divorces 
                                                 
9 These job losses are involuntary in the sense that the husband did not chose to end his employment. However, 
they could be correlated with the characteristics (observed and unobserved) of the husband and are, thus, not 
necessarily fully exogenous. Indeed, the potential correlation with certain characteristics is one explanation 
for an increase in the divorce probability following the involuntary job loss. 
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to the total number of household-year observations results in an annual relative frequency 
of divorce (for all married couples) of roughly 0.7% within our sample10. 
In some specifications we also allow for a job loss to have an impact on marital stability 
even after a new job is found. In particular, we include additional dummy variables, coding 
for job take up as well as the type of the preceding employment termination. This step 
further separates the men, who have experienced (a specific type of) a job loss at some 
point in time, into those who have found a new job and those who have not. One might 
also argue that after some time in a new job the dissolution probability should no longer be 
affected and that these men should, thus, re-join the control group once dissolution 
probabilities have converged. Alternatively, we could (arbitrarily) define a threshold for 
tenure. When the threshold is passed a man would migrate into the control group. We 
pursue this alternative approach in an analysis presented in Appendix A and consider the 
timing of responses explicitly in a robustness check in section 5. Falsely excluding men no 
longer affected by the past job loss from the control group should not bias the coefficient 
estimate on the variable coding for the group of husbands that are still unemployed after a 
job loss since the control group is still representative of unaffected individuals. If, on the 
other hand, still affected men migrate into the control group a bias towards a zero effect 
will arise. However, the coefficient on the variable capturing the effect of having a new job 
after a job loss clearly depends on who is in that particular group. 
The above specification does not take couple-specific time-invariant characteristics into 
account. Ignoring unobserved heterogeneity – or “frailty” in the survival analysis literature 
– will lead to an overestimation of negative duration dependence, i.e. the baseline hazard 
is biased downwards, and result in a bias towards zero (smaller absolute values) of the ߚ 
coefficients (Jenkins 2005). We incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in all estimations 
via couple-specific random effects. The adjusted hazard function for each couple ݅ is 
݄௜ሺݐሻ ൌ ͳ െ ൣെ൫ߚᇱ ௜ܺ ൅ ߛሺݐሻ൯ݒ௜൧ (2)  
                                                 
10 According to data from the German Federal Statistical Office there were a total of 17.6 million married 
couples and ca. 162 000 divorces in 2016, equivalent to an annual relative frequency of divorce of roughly 
0.9%. The lower relative frequency of divorce in our sample could have several possible causes. However, 
the most plausible explanation is that our frequency is based on several observation periods, some of which 
were decades earlier. 
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where ݒ௜ is a couple random effect. Estimating this model requires an assumption about 
the distribution of these random effects. The normal or gamma distribution are typical 
choices, however, several papers also apply Heckman and Singer’s (1984) idea of a discrete 
distribution, characterised by a number of mass points and their probabilities. We assume 
a normal distribution. A simulation study by Nicoletti and Rondinelli (2010) showed that 
this choice results in unbiased coefficients even if the true distribution is a gamma or 
discrete distribution. 
 
4. Results 
All tables present the results in relative risk format, i.e. ݁ఉ. Thus, entries larger than 1 
imply that the risk of a dissolution occurring in a given period is associated with an increase 
in the respective explanatory variable, while entries smaller than 1 indicate a lower relative 
risk of divorce. 
Table 1 reports the results for our initial specification based on the complementary log-
log model with normally distributed frailty and single-spell data. The lag structure of the 
model implies that the exponential of the coefficient is to be interpreted as follows (column 
1, first entry): If a husband experienced an involuntary job loss at some point in the past, 
the dissolution risk in the following period is 69.9% larger than the dissolution risk of 
couples in which the husband remained employed. Job losses due to other reasons also 
associated with an increase the risk of dissolution, yet on a smaller scale of only 37%. The 
difference is not statistically significant. 
Column (2) differentiates by employment status after the job loss occurred, i.e. whether 
the man is still without a job or has found new employment. Having an unemployed or 
inactive husband after a job loss is associated with an increase in the risk of a divorce by 
67%. However, even if a new job was found, the risk of dissolution is 42.4% larger than 
the risk of those couples where the husband never experienced a job loss. The difference 
in estimates is not statistically significant.  
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Table 1: Divorce risk, single spell (cloglog including frailty) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݅݊ݒ݋݈ݑ݊ݐܽݎݕሻ  1.699*** 
(0.254) 
  
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ  1.370*** 
(0.128) 
  
 ܰ݋݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ   1.670*** 
(0.257) 
1.675*** 
(0.258) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ  1.424*** 
(0.136) 
 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݅݊ݒ݋݈ݑ݊ݐܽݎݕሻ    1.753*** 
(0.272) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ   1.350*** 
(0.167) 
     
 No. of failures 712 712 712 
 No. of couples 13,407 13,407 13,407 
 Couple-Year observations 116,069 116,069 116,069 
 Log likelihood -3,932.600 -3,932.198 -3,930.826 
 ߩ  0.201 0.178 0.200 
 LR Test of ߩ ൌ Ͳ (p-value) 0.188 0.225 0.190 
Please note: All regressions include the following variables for both men and women: age, dummies on migration background, education 
(in years), unemployment experience and the following household characteristics:, dummy for house ownership, dummies for the 
number of children, dummy on area (rural or urban) as well as dummies for woman’s employment status (fulltime employed in private 
sector, part-time employed in private sector, fulltime self-employed, part-time self-employed, fulltime public service, part-time public 
service, in training, internship, pensioner; inactive is reference) and dummies for man’s employment status (pensioner, inactive, (former) 
self-employed). ߩ is the proportion of the (total) variance explained by couple-specific random components. 
The baseline hazard is modelled via 42 dummies on marriage duration. A constant is not included.  
* indicates that exp(coeff) is significantly different from 1 at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
In column (3) we repeat the analysis from column (2), but allow the estimated relative 
risk associated with having a new job to vary depending on the type of the initial job loss. 
Due to small cell size, we do not apply the same differentiation in the case where the 
husband is unemployed.11 Out of the 1,526 involuntary job losses, only 243 men did not 
start a new job within the next year. All other men either found new employment or 
switched into another category, such as retirees. Just as in column (2) there is a significant 
relationship between job loss and marital stability in the next period, even if the husband 
obtained a new job in the meantime. However, the increase in the dissolution risk is larger 
if the job loss prior to the current employment was involuntary (75.3%) rather than another 
type of job loss (35.0%). 
A key interpretation of our results is in terms of the informational content of the 
employment termination in regards to the quality of the match. A termination of the 
employment relationship may result in an information update about both the partner’s 
earning potential as well as the non-pecuniary compatibility of the couple. In addition, 
experiencing an employment termination as well as taking up a new job could be associated 
                                                 
11 This was done in an unreported regression. The point estimates of both effects are similar in magnitude, 
though slightly larger for involuntary job losses than for other types of job losses. However, probably due to 
the mentioned small cell size, the former estimated effect is not statistically significantly different from zero. 
Given these results, we prefer the more parsimonious specification in column (2) which combines the two 
types of job loss. 
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with high levels of stress, which in turn could lead to an increased incidence of family 
conflict and divorce. Since the following sections provide some additional insights, we 
postpone a more detailed interpretation and discussion of our results until section 5 and 6, 
which also includes some model extensions. 
 
5. Robustness Analyses 
This section considers two key robustness checks. Firstly, the sample is restricted to 
couples observed from the start of their marriage. Secondly, we allow for time-varying 
effects. 
For some couples the start of their marriage is not directly observed in the SOEP. This 
delayed entry to the sample or left truncation of already married couples is unproblematic 
in the absence of unobserved heterogeneity. However, with unobserved heterogeneity 
results may be biased (Jenkins 2005). To investigate this concern, Table 2 reports results 
based on a sample consisting of only those couples where the start of the marriage is 
observed. Applying this sample restriction results in a sizeable sample size reduction of 
more than 75% to only 25,818 couple-year observations. As a consequence, the baseline 
hazard had to be adjusted and is now only fully flexible for the first 20 years of marriage 
and assumed to be constant thereafter.  
Table 2: Divorce risk, left truncation (cloglog including frailty) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݅݊ݒ݋݈ݑ݊ݐܽݎݕሻ  2.011*** 
(0.414) 
  
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ  1.405** 
(0.189) 
  
 ܰ݋݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ   1.987*** 
(0.431) 
2.039*** 
(0.450) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ  1.435*** 
(0.193) 
 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݅݊ݒ݋݈ݑ݊ݐܽݎݕሻ    2.275*** 
(0.489) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ   1.274* 
(0.187) 
     
 No. of failures 348 348 348 
 No. of couples 3,418 3,418 3,418 
 Couple-Year observations 25,818 25,818 25,818 
 Log likelihood -1,775.982 -1,756.285 -1,752.658 
 ߩ  0.247 0.245 0.343 
 LR Test of ߩ ൌ Ͳ (p-value) 0.240 0.251 0.133 
Please note: All regressions include the following variables for both men and women: age, dummies on migration background, education 
(in years), unemployment experience and the following household characteristics, dummy for house ownership, dummies for the number 
of children, dummy on area (rural or urban) as well as dummies for woman’s employment status (fulltime employed in private sector, 
part-time employed in private sector, fulltime self-employed, part-time self-employed, fulltime public service, part-time public service, 
in training, internship, pensioner; inactive is reference) and dummies for man’s employment status (pensioner, inactive, (former) self-
employed). ߩ is the proportion of the (total) variance explained by couple-specific random components. 
The baseline hazard is modelled via 20 dummies on marriage duration. A constant is not included.  
* indicates that exp(coeff) is significantly different from 1 at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
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The qualitative results are robust to this adjustment. However, comparing the point 
estimates to those in Table 1, the estimated relative risk of marital dissolution related to 
employment termination with subsequent unemployment appears larger in this sample. 
Another notable change is that if new employment was found the type of initial job loss 
appears to matter more. The difference in the dissolution risk between an involuntary job 
loss and other types of job losses is statistically significant at the 1 % level.  
There are two explanations for these changes. The first is effect heterogeneity, 
depending on marriage duration or age of individuals. On average, we expect the couples 
in this sample to have been married for a shorter period of time compared to the full sample. 
Thus, we might interpret these changes in the point estimates as an indication that 
involuntary job loss is a more important signal during the early stages of the marriage. 
Furthermore, the average age of individuals in the sample is lower. Changing jobs early in 
the career is common. Thus, job loss for other reasons could be expected and should have 
a lower or no impact on divorce. The second explanation for this result is unobserved 
heterogeneity of the couples. In particular, the left truncated couples, i.e. couples who 
already “survived” several years, are a specific subsample of all marriages, such that their 
average random effect might no longer be zero. In this case, excluding these couples 
corrects for the bias otherwise resulting in too conservative estimates (Gou 1993). However, 
since this cannot explain why the estimated the relative risk is smaller for those who have 
found a job after a job loss for other reasons, this does not appear to be the only explanation. 
Changes compared to Table 1 can, of course, also be attributed to the much smaller sample 
size. Due to this large reduction in the sample size and because, if anything, using the full 
sample results in too cautious point estimates, at least for the variables of key interest, we 
choose to rely on the full sample for further robustness checks and extensions. 
In Table 3 we relax the assumption of proportional hazards by interacting our key 
variables of interest with time dummies, representing the time the husband has already 
spent in his respective status. We allow for different coefficients for the first year, the 
second year and for three or more years spent in a specific status. Thus, while we still 
assume a constant hazard after three years, the coefficients for the first and second year are 
flexible. If couples decide to divorce based on expected (future) income, expected (future) 
stress and updated personal characteristics, then agent’s foresight must either be biased or 
new information must be released in subsequent periods (i.e. new shocks) for any of the 
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aforementioned channels to have an effect beyond the first period. A permanent reduction 
in the expected future value of the match due to the employment termination makes it more 
likely that later negative shocks push the couple over the divorce boundary later on. The 
point estimates in Column (1) show that a job loss is associated with an increase in the risk 
of divorce. However, the magnitude of the relationship is decreasing over time. This is in 
line with earlier results from Charles and Stephens (2004) who also found the strongest 
effects in the first year following a job loss. Columns (2) and (3) separate the effects for 
those who did not find a new job (yet) and those who did. Perhaps surprisingly, the relative 
risk of dissolution associated with not having a job after an employment termination is 
highest two years after the initial employment termination12. However, this could also be 
attributed to information updating due to the additional signal arising from the husband 
failing to obtain employment after a potentially expected transition period of one year. At 
this point he is also considered long-term unemployed, which has been shown to be 
associated with greater state-dependence in the labour market status (Arulampalam et al. 
2000, Plum and Ayllón 2015) and thus significantly reduced financial prospects. If new 
employment was found, the increase in the dissolution risk appears to be large in the first 
year but decreases significantly over time. This indicates that the role the initial 
employment termination plays in determining the expected future value of the match may 
fade over time as newer information becomes available, e.g. that the husband is able to 
hold the new job. An alternative interpretation is that after some time following a job loss 
(after taking up a new job), the stress associated with the job loss (taking up a new job) is 
reduced and the family has (largely) completed the adjustment process to the new everyday 
life. Nonetheless, involuntary job losses are still associated with higher relative risks of 
dissolution than employment termination for other reasons. Strikingly, the associated 
increase in divorce risk in the first year in the new job following an involuntary job loss is 
significantly (at the 10% level) higher than for those who remained unemployed. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis that not only the job loss itself but also taking up a new job 
is a stressor for the family13. 
  
                                                 
12 The difference between the first and second year of unemployment is, however, not statistically significant. 
13 Coping mechanisms have been investigated e.g. by Leana and Feldman (1988), Feldman and Brett (1983) 
and McCarthy and Lambert (1999). Nelson (1990) gives an overview of stressors related to taking up a new 
job. For an overview of theoretical and empirical papers on the effect of stress on the risk of divorce see 
Bodenmann et al. (2007) 
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Table 3: Divorce risk, time-varying effects (cloglog including frailty) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݅݊ݒ݋݈ݑ݊ݐܽݎݕሻ     
 1st year 2.395*** 
(0.466) 
  
 2nd year 1.610 
(0.500) 
  
 3 or more years 1.184 
(0.268) 
  
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ     
 1st year 1.471*** 
(0.182) 
  
 2nd year 1.457** 
(0.228) 
  
 3 or more years 1.236* 
(0.144) 
  
 ܰ݋݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ     
 1st year  1.639*** 
(0.293) 
1.639*** 
(0.293) 
 2nd year  1.779** 
(0.523) 
1.779** 
(0.523) 
 3 or more years  1.700* 
(0.513) 
1.701* 
(0.514) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ    
 1st year  1.713*** 
(0.221) 
 
 2nd year  1.413** 
(0.233) 
 
 3 or more years  1.252* 
(0.149) 
 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݅݊ݒ݋݈ݑ݊ݐܽݎݕሻ     
 1st year   2.535*** 
(0.527) 
 2nd year   1.630 
(0.529) 
 3 or more years   1.265 
(0.289) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ    
 1st year   1.487*** 
(0.222) 
 2nd year   1.358* 
(0.250) 
 3 or more years   1.248* 
(0.156) 
     
 No. of failures 712 712 712 
 No. of couples 13,407 13,407 13,407 
 Couple-Year observations 116,069 116,069 116,069 
 Log likelihood -3,928.781 -3,930.018 -3,927.576 
 ߩ  0.061 0.097 0.090 
 LR Test of ߩ ൌ Ͳ (p-value) 0.416 0.359 0.370 
Please note: All regressions include the following variables for both men and women: age, dummies on migration background, education 
(in years), unemployment experience and the following household characteristics: dummy for house ownership, dummies for the number 
of children, dummy on area (rural or urban) as well as dummies for woman’s employment status (fulltime employed in private sector, 
part-time employed in private sector, fulltime self-employed, part-time self-employed, fulltime public service, part-time public service, 
in training, internship, pensioner; inactive is reference) and dummies for man’s employment status (pensioner, inactive, (former) self-
employed). ߩ is the proportion of the (total) variance explained by couple-specific random components. 
The baseline hazard is modelled via 42 dummies on marriage duration. A constant is not included.  
* indicates that exp(coeff) is significantly different from 1 at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
Table 3 also serves as a means to check whether it would be possible to assign more 
families to the control group. If there is no scarring effect, there should be no difference in 
divorce risk between those in a new job after a previous job loss and the control group after 
some time in the new job. 
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Following this argument, we also re-estimated Table 1 with a control group including 
men that have been in a new job for four years or more. The results displayed in Appendix 
A are both in size and statistical significance close to our initial results. The small and 
insignificant changes that did occur are in line with our discussion in section 3. 
 
6. Discussion and Extensions 
The reasons for a divorce can be multifaceted. In this section, we discuss some 
explanations for a marital dissolution following a job loss or employment termination that 
are consistent with the results presented in section 4 and 5. In addition, we present some 
model extensions to investigate some of the underlying reasons. 
Across specifications, our results show that an employment termination of the husband 
is associated with an increase in the dissolution risk, which we attribute, amongst other 
explanations addressed below, to the resulting information updating regarding the future 
financial status and non-pecuniary compatibility of the couple. It is also plausible that 
involuntary job losses convey more (negative) information than employment terminations 
for other reasons. In particular, other types of job losses could be voluntary quits due to the 
availability of better employment opportunities or because the couple jointly agreed on this 
course of action. We would not expect these types of employment termination to affect 
marital stability (negatively). However, this argument will not hold for all employment 
terminations for other reasons, such as a temporary contract ending which was expected to 
be extended. Thus, a job loss for other reasons can, but does not necessarily have to, convey 
any negative information. These arguments are consistent with the lower, though still 
significant, point estimates associated with other job losses compared to involuntary job 
losses across specifications. 
Given the signalling argument, the large estimated relative risk associated with job 
displacement even after having obtained a new job (particularly if the job loss was 
involuntary), may appear surprising since obtaining new employment is presumably 
beneficial compared to remaining unemployed. We propose three explanations for this 
result. Firstly, it is not clear whether the new job provides the same level of income as 
before (Jacobson et al. 1993, Eliason and Storrie 2006, Couch and Placzek 2010; for papers 
that focus on German data see Couch 2001 or Fackler and Hank 2016). The couple may be 
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surprised by the income realisation, which causes an additional update of beliefs about the 
future earnings potential. Secondly, having lost a job (even if new employment was found) 
can still provide a negative signal about the non-pecuniary suitability as a mate relative to 
the comparison group where no job loss occurred, explaining part of, albeit not the entire, 
large relative risk estimate. Furthermore, depending on the type of job taken up, the signal 
may even be negative compared to being unemployed if the new job does not meet the 
expectations held while still being unemployed, just as argued above in the context of 
household income. Thirdly, job search and taking up a new job is associated with high 
levels of stress and uncertainty, which could lead to breakdown of the relationship. Thus, 
even if obtaining a new job may provide a positive signal about personal characteristics of 
a partner and future income, it may induce stress in the short term. In addition, the new job 
may have other non-monetary negative characteristics such as less desirable working hours 
and commuting time that place continuous strain on the couple’s relationship. To 
investigate this issue we included a number of controls for changes in job characteristics. 
In particular, the role of wages is captured by the ratio of current to former wage. In 
addition, to evaluate the importance of (un-)desirable working hours, we construct a 
variable which is equal to the ratio of actual and desired hour worked in the current job 
over the same measure for the old job. If no new job was taken up, both of these variables 
are set to unity. Unfortunately, we do not have data on the exact time spent commuting. 
We do, however, know whether the husband commuted daily, weekly or less frequently. 
Thus, we decided to include two dummy variables, one indicating an increase and the other 
indicating a decrease in the commuting frequency, leaving no change in commuting 
frequency as the default category. The results are reported in table 4. Considering the 
results reported in columns (1) to (4), which do not allow for variation in the coefficients 
across time, it appears that the ratio of current to former wage individually absorbs more 
of the total estimated effect of obtaining a new job after an involuntary job loss than the 
other controls. When all controls are included jointly, no significant relationship between 
having obtained a new job after any form of employment termination and the risk of marital 
dissolution remains. When we allow for heterogeneous effects for the first, second and 
following years in an employment status in columns (5) to (8) a similar pattern emerges. 
Just as in Table 3, the estimated relative risks are the highest in the first year of a new job 
if the previous job loss was involuntary. Interestingly the wage ratio has the largest 
unilateral impact on the point estimate associated with taking up a new job if the preceding 
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employment termination was involuntary, while hours worked are more important if the 
preceding employment termination was due to other reasons. All estimated relative risks 
associated with taking up a new job become insignificantly different from unity if all three 
additional controls are included jointly, even though some point estimates remain large. 
The reduction in point estimates in Table 3 columns (3) and (7) compared to Table 1 
column (3) and Table 2 column (3), respectively, shows that changes in the wage between 
former and current job explain a large part of the estimated relationship, indicating that 
updates of expectations regarding the husband’s future income stream plays an important 
role. 
It would also be interesting to analyse the underlying reasons, such as the income 
channel, for the estimated relative risks for the other changes in employment status (e.g. 
involuntary job loss without taking up a new job). However, unlike in the case of taking 
up a new job, there are no convincing additional control variables to capture each suggested 
channel. As a cursory investigation into the importance of the income channel as a whole, 
not only regarding taking up a new job, we did include current household income in an 
unreported regression. The key results remained largely unchanged in sign, significance 
level and magnitude. However, the inclusion of current household income only removes 
an intractable part of the actual expected lifetime-income effect, which is not observed in 
the SOEP. Since our primary aim is to consider the total effect of job loss/ employment 
termination on divorce, including the (expected lifetime-)income channel, we do not 
control for household income in any of the regressions reported in section 4 and 5. 
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How well a couple is able to cope with an employment termination of the husband 
likely also depends on the wife’s labour market outcome. Whether a wife’s employment 
increases or reduces the increase in the dissolution risk associated with the husband’s 
employment determination is, a priori, not clear. In Table 5 we allow for different effects 
of job losses on the risk of separation depending on the wife’s labour market position. In 
all instances, the estimated relative risk of separation is lower if the wife is employed 
compared to an unemployed or inactive wife. The reasons for this result can be manifold.  
Table 5: Interaction with woman’s employment status (cloglog including frailty) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݅݊ݒ݋݈ݑ݊ݐܽݎݕሻ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀  
1.465** 
(0.264) 
  
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݅݊ݒ݋݈ݑ݊ݐܽݎݕሻ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊ݑ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀݋ݎ݅݊ܽܿݐ݅ݒ݁  
2.848*** 
(0.719) 
  
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀   
1.338*** 
(0.147) 
  
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊ݑ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀݋ݎ݅݊ܽܿݐ݅ݒ݁  
1.698*** 
(0.283) 
  
 ܰ݋݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀   
 1.610*** 
(0.294) 
1.618*** 
(0.297) 
 ܰ݋݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊ݑ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀݋ݎ݅݊ܽܿݐ݅ݒ݁  
 2.089*** 
(0.522) 
2.102*** 
(0.526) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀  
 1.315** 
(0.145) 
 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊ݑ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀݋ݎ݅݊ܽܿݐ݅ݒ݁  
 1.868*** 
(0.312) 
 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݅݊ݒ݋݈ݑ݊ݐܽݎݕሻ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀   
   1.424* 
(0.267) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ ሺ݅݊ݒ݋݈ݑ݊ݐܽݎݕሻ 
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊ݑ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀݋ݎ݅݊ܽܿݐ݅ݒ݁  
  3.040*** 
(0.780) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀  
  1.298** 
(0.152) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊ݑ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀݋ݎ݅݊ܽܿݐ݅ݒ݁  
  1.613*** 
(0.297) 
     
 No. of failures 712 712 712 
 No. of couples 13,407 13,407 13,407 
 Couple-Year observations 116,069 116,069 116,069 
 Log likelihood -3,927.577 -3,928.761 -3,926.072 
 ߩ  0.204 0.153 0.189 
 LR Test of ߩ ൌ Ͳ (p-value) 0.183 0.270 0.204 
Please note: All regressions include the following variables for both men and women: age, dummies on migration background, education 
(in years), unemployment experience and the following household characteristics: household income (adjusted for number of adults and 
children by the OECD equivalence scale), dummy for house ownership, dummies for the number of children, dummy on area (rural or 
urban) as well as dummies for woman’s employment status (fulltime employed in private sector, part-time employed in private sector, 
fulltime self-employed, part-time self-employed, fulltime public service, part-time public service, in training, internship, pensioner; 
inactive is reference) and dummies for man’s employment status (pensioner, inactive, (former) self-employed). 
All regressions also include an interaction with women, that are either self-employed, in training, in internship or pensioners. ߩ is the 
proportion of the (total) variance explained by couple-specific random components. 
The baseline hazard is modelled via 42 dummies on marriage duration. A constant is not included.  
* indicates that exp(coeff) is significantly different from 1 at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
Firstly, an employment termination likely has a stronger impact on the couple’s finances if 
the wife is not employed potentially leading to more intense stress due to the financial 
hardship. It could also be the case that traditional gender norms are more prevalent amongst 
(previous) single earner couples, making the husband’s deviation from the “male 
breadwinner norm” due to the experienced employment termination more detrimental to 
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the stability off these matches. Lastly, some inactive women may have only remained with 
their partner due to financial dependency, causing a dissolution as soon as this reason for 
staying with the partner is no longer present. However, even though the wife’s employment 
reduces the estimated relative risk of divorce associated with the husband’s employment 
termination, our findings do not rule out counteracting processes completely. For example, 
Knabe et al. (2016) showed that the husband’s life-satisfaction is impacted less severely by 
unemployment if the wife is also unemployed, which presumably should have a negative 
impact on marital stability. 
Throughout our analysis, we have distinguished between involuntary job losses and 
employment terminations for other reasons because we suspected that these differ in their 
information content and because employment termination for other reasons likely suffers 
from an endogeneity problem. Regarding both points one might object that, given these 
concerns, it would be even better to distinguish the type of involuntary job loss further, 
since the variable currently includes plant closings as well as individual lay-offs14. Charles 
and Stephens (2004) as well as Doiran and Mendolia (2012) have argued that both lay-offs 
and plant closures can be indicative of lower future earnings, but only lay-offs provide 
information about a partner’s non-pecuniary suitability as a mate. In Appendix B we briefly 
examine the potential for heterogeneous effects depending on the type of involuntary job 
loss. The qualitative results presented in Table 1 hold for both types of involuntary job 
losses. There does not appear to be a considerable difference in estimated relative risks nor 
are the estimated relative risks consistently lower/higher for plant closings. Eliason (2012) 
has argued that plant closures, albeit independent of personal characteristics of the 
employees, may still operate as a stressor to the family, changing everyday routine, social 
networks and identities. We suspect that the stress brought about by any job loss can still 
induce conflict within the family and reveal negative aspects of the partner’s personality, 
even if the initial employment termination did not. Therefore, we would be cautious to 
interpret these results as evidence that information updating regarding the partner’s 
personal characteristics is completely irrelevant.  
However, including the distinction between plant closings and lay-offs is also 
interesting because, even regarding our basic analysis of involuntary job losses, one could 
                                                 
14 In our sample most husbands in this group were affected by lay-offs (ca. 1000) rather than plant closings 
(ca. 500) 
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object that some workers possess certain traits that increase both their risk of an individual 
lay-off as well as their risk of marital dissolution leading to selection bias in our estimates. 
On the other hand, it has been argued that plant closures constitute a truly exogenous source 
of job displacement. In this way, the results of the aforementioned Appendix B can also 
serve as a robustness check, since the results based solely on plant closures should not 
suffer from an endogeneity problem. We have chosen to not pursue this approach in the 
main section due to the resulting small sample size in each cell once we consider certain 
model extension, the insignificant differences in the estimates and because any potential 
difference in estimates could not necessarily be interpreted in terms of the underlying 
processes for the reasons mentioned above. Lastly, we are confident that our results are not 
primarily driven by time-constant personal traits. Charles and Stephens (2004) already 
argued in their analysis, that any time-constant personal traits driving the results would be 
inconsistent with declining coefficients over time.  
Nonetheless, we do acknowledge that, especially when we differentiate between those 
who found a new job and those who remained unemployed, our results are more of 
descriptive nature rather than indicating a clear causal relationship. There are good reasons 
to believe that those who find a new job differ in their unobserved characteristics compared 
to those who do not find a new job, thus finding a new job is not an exogenous event. The 
reported correlations may provide some initial insights into the consequences of job losses 
regarding the risk of marital dissolution, but do not enable us to draw conclusions on how 
active labour market programs would affect the risk of dissolution. It should be noted that, 
even if time constant personality traits do not explain the estimated results, this does not 
mean that character traits are irrelevant for marital stability, as they can still influence the 
baseline hazard for the couple. Furthermore, part of our interpretation is based on 
information updating regarding these characteristics. However, under this interpretation, it 
is the perception of personal characteristics that matters for marital stability and this 
perception is changed due to the employment termination. Thus, while we cannot be sure 
that the results are necessarily causal, the proposed character trait based explanation is not, 
per se, add odds with a causal relationship. 
Lastly, we want to note that our estimations are based only on married couples. We 
abstain from drawing inference on the effects of job losses on the stability of the 
relationship of unmarried, cohabiting couples. The analysis also exclusively considers the 
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effects of the husband’s job loss on marital dissolution. The effects of a job loss of the wife 
can be different, amongst other reasons due to different role identities. In unreported 
regression results, we found the estimated coefficients of women’s involuntary job losses 
to be insignificant, which is consistent with the idea of a male-breadwinner role model. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Our study analyses the relationship between (involuntary) employment termination and 
the risk of marital dissolution using recent micro-level data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel. An employment termination affects a variety of aspects of an individual’s 
life. These consequences could potentially be long-term and even persist after new 
employment has been found. Therefore, we extend the analysis by allowing a preceding 
employment termination to have a different impact on the divorce probability once a new 
job was found compared to the husband being/remaining unemployed. In a number of 
extensions, we also analyse the timing of the response, which variables could explain the 
overall effect and consider interactions with the wife’s labour market status. 
Overall, our results are consistent with previous studies by Doiron and Mendolia (2012), 
Eliason (2012) as well as Charles and Stephens (2004). However, quantitatively our results 
indicate a smaller relationship between job loss and marital dissolution than the one 
estimated by Doiron and Mendolia (2012), which could be explained by country specific 
effects. An involuntary job loss is associated with an increase in the estimated risk of 
dissolution by roughly 70 %. We interpret these results primarily as a job loss conveying 
new (negative) information about the future value of the match, resulting in a breakdown 
of the match. An involuntary job loss may be indicative of both lower future earnings 
potential as well as other unobserved undesirable personal characteristics of the husband. 
Another important contributing factor could be the increase in stress brought about by the 
new situation. The impact is typically largest in the period immediately following the job 
loss or taking up a new job. The substantially lower point estimates in the second and later 
years after the employment termination are statistically insignificant in some cases. An 
exception is a small increase in the dissolution risk in the second year after an employment 
termination if no new job was obtained. This indicates that, conditional on surviving the 
initial (few) period(s)after the job loss, the impact of an employment termination fades 
away, at least if new employment was found. Interestingly, the highest increase in 
24 
dissolution risk, at roughly 154 %, is associated with the first year in a new job. We have 
suggested that obtaining a new job could also convey new (negative) information about 
both the husband’s earnings capability as well as his personal characteristics. In addition, 
new sources of stress are associated with taking up a new job. The job could also have 
other non-monetary negative aspects such as less desirable working hours and commuting 
time, providing an explanation for this large estimate. These channels are generally 
supported by our results, which specifically indicate a prominent role of the ratio of the 
wage in the old and new job. The size of the estimated relative risk of dissolution is lower 
if the wife is employed rather than unemployed. 
Since our results are based on a partial equilibrium approach they should, however, not 
be used to predict the impact of a fundamental labour market policy change, such as moving 
from high employment protection to flexicurity15. An economy wide increase in turnover 
implies that each individual employment termination would no longer be unusual and a 
new job typically found quickly. The negative signal regarding personal characteristics and 
future earnings potential would (presumably) be reduced or even eliminated. However, the 
influence on the level of stress experienced due to employment termination, job search and 
taking up a new job is unclear. Nonetheless, if workers suspect a causal relationship 
between job loss and divorce, which is consistent with our analysis, this would provide 
another explanation why insiders, i.e. (permanent) workers, prefer stricter dismissal 
protection. In addition to increasing their job security, they would profit from a (perceived) 
reduced risk of marital dissolution. 
 
                                                 
15 A system in which firms can adjust their workforce more flexibly, while social security provisions and 
active labour market policies are in place to support individuals affected by a job loss. 
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Appendix  
Appendix A: Divorce Risk, single spell, different control group (cloglog including frailty) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݅݊ݒ݋݈ݑ݊ݐܽݎݕሻ  1.878*** 
(0.294) 
  
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ  1.426*** 
(0.134) 
  
 ܰ݋݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ   1.611*** 
(0.238) 
1.612*** 
(0.239) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ  1.532*** 
(0.149) 
 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݅݊ݒ݋݈ݑ݊ݐܽݎݕሻ    1.975*** 
(0.325) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ   1.417*** 
(0.153) 
     
 No. of failures 712 712 712 
 No. of couples 13,407 13,407 13,407 
 Couple-Year observations 116,069 116,069 116,069 
 Log likelihood -3,930.155 -3,930.269 -3,928.667 
 ߩ  0.002 0.078 0.008 
 LR Test of ߩ ൌ Ͳ (p-value) 0.488 0.482 0.477 
Please note: All regressions include the following variables for both men and women: age, dummies on migration background, education (in years), 
unemployment experience and the following household characteristics: dummy for house ownership, dummies for the number of children, dummy on area 
(rural or urban) as well as dummies for woman’s employment status (fulltime employed in private sector, part-time employed in private sector, fulltime 
self-employed, part-time self-employed, fulltime public service, part-time public service, in training, internship, pensioner; inactive is reference) and 
dummies for man’s employment status (pensioner, inactive, (former) self-employed). ߩ is the proportion of the (total) variance explained by couple-specific 
random components. 
The baseline hazard is modelled via 42 dummies on marriage duration. A constant is not included. The control group consists of couples in which the man 
has never experienced a job loss while in the sample as well as couples in which the man has lost his job, found a new job and holds this job for four or 
more years. 
* indicates that exp(coeff) is significantly different from 1 at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
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Appendix B1: Plant closures and dismissals differentiated (cloglog including frailty) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݌݈ܽ݊ݐ݈ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁ሻ  1.930*** 
(0.328) 
   
1st year  3.027*** 
(0.650) 
  
2nd year  1.654 
(0.635) 
  
3 or more years  1.204 
(0.323) 
  
ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݀݅ݏ݉݅ݏݏ݈ܽሻ  1.851** 
(0.470) 
   
1st year  2.021* 
(0.835) 
  
2nd year  2.133 
(1.076) 
  
3 or more years  1.503 
(0.543) 
  
ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ  1.487*** 
(0.139) 
   
1st year  1.674*** 
(0.209) 
  
2nd year  1.581*** 
(0.256) 
  
3 or more years  1.293** 
(0.149) 
  
ܰ݋݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ   1.739*** 
(0.281) 
 
1st year    1.756*** 
(0.328) 
2nd year    1.964** 
(0.597) 
3 or more years    1.476 
(0.503) 
ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݌݈ܽ݊ݐ݈ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁ሻ    1.952*** 
(0.349) 
 
1st year    3.118*** 
(0.719) 
2nd year    1.600 
(0.663) 
3 or more years    1.294 
(0.354) 
ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݀݅ݏ݉݅ݏݏ݈ܽሻ    1.966*** 
(0.501) 
 
1st year    2.210* 
(0.916) 
2nd year    2.289 
(1.158) 
3 or more years    1.573 
(0.577) 
ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ   1.495*** 
(0.152) 
 
1st year    1.740*** 
(0.261) 
2nd year    1.477** 
(0.282) 
3 or more years    1.335** 
(0.169) 
     
No. of failures 712 712 712 712 
No. of couples 13,407 13,407 13,407 13,407 
Couple-Year observations 116,069 116,069 116,069 116,069 
Log likelihood -3,927.315 -3,921.811 -3,925.803 -3,921.097 
ߩ  0.200 0.025 0.199 0.055 
LR Test of ߩ ൌ Ͳ (p-value) 0.182 0.468 0.183 0.420 
Please note: All regressions include the following variables for both men and women: age, dummies on migration background, education (in years), 
unemployment experience and the following household characteristics: dummy for house ownership, dummies for the number of children, dummy on area 
(rural or urban) as well as dummies for woman’s employment status (fulltime employed in private sector, part-time employed in private sector, fulltime 
self-employed, part-time self-employed, fulltime public service, part-time public service, in training, internship, pensioner; inactive is reference) and 
dummies for man’s employment status (pensioner, inactive, (former) self-employed). ߩ is the proportion of the (total) variance explained by couple-specific 
random components. 
The baseline hazard is modelled via 42 dummies on marriage duration. A constant is not included. * indicates that exp(coeff) is significantly different from 
1 at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.* indicates that exp(coeff) is significantly different from 1 at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
31 
Appendix B2: Plant closures and dismissals differentiated (cloglog including frailty); left truncation 
  (1) (2) 
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݌݈ܽ݊ݐ݈ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁ሻ  2.567*** 
(0.852) 
 
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݀݅ݏ݉݅ݏݏ݈ܽሻ  1.823** 
(0.429) 
 
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ  1.404** 
(0.189) 
 
 ܰ݋݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ   2.034*** 
(0.449) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݌݈ܽ݊ݐ݈ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁ሻ   2.747*** 
(0.942) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݀݅ݏ݉݅ݏݏ݈ܽሻ   2.102*** 
(0.514) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ   
    
 No. of failures 348 348 
 No. of couples 3,418 3,418 
 Couple-Year observations 25,818 25,818 
 Log likelihood -1,755.425 -1,752.282 
 ߩ  0.255 0.347 
 LR Test of ߩ ൌ Ͳ (p-value) 0.236 0.133 
Please note: All regressions include the following variables for both men and women: age, dummies on migration background, education (in years), 
unemployment experience and the following household characteristics, dummy for house ownership, dummies for the number of children, dummy on area 
(rural or urban) as well as dummies for woman’s employment status (fulltime employed in private sector, part-time employed in private sector, fulltime 
self-employed, part-time self-employed, fulltime public service, part-time public service, in training, internship, pensioner; inactive is reference) and 
dummies for man’s employment status (pensioner, inactive, (former) self-employed). ߩ is the proportion of the (total) variance explained by couple-specific 
random components. 
The baseline hazard is modelled via 20 dummies on marriage duration. A constant is not included.  
* indicates that exp(coeff) is significantly different from 1 at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
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Appendix B4: Plant closures and dismissals differentiated (cloglog including frailty); Interaction with woman’s employment 
status (cloglog including frailty) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݌݈ܽ݊ݐ݈ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁ሻ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀  
1.125 
(0.374) 
  
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݌݈ܽ݊ݐ݈ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁ሻ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊ݑ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀݋ݎ݅݊ܽܿݐ݅ݒ݁  
3.321*** 
(1.358) 
  
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݀݅ݏ݉݅ݏݏ݈ܽሻ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀  
1.625** 
(0.331) 
  
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݀݅ݏ݉݅ݏݏ݈ܽሻ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊ݑ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀݋ݎ݅݊ܽܿݐ݅ݒ݁  
2.676*** 
(0.783) 
  
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀   
1.339*** 
(0.147) 
  
 ܬ݋ܾܮ݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊ݑ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀݋ݎ݅݊ܽܿݐ݅ݒ݁  
1.700*** 
(0.284) 
  
 ܰ݋݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀   
 1.610*** 
(0.294) 
 
 ܰ݋݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊ݑ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀݋ݎ݅݊ܽܿݐ݅ݒ݁  
 2.089*** 
(0.522) 
 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀  
 1.315** 
(0.145) 
 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊ݑ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀݋ݎ݅݊ܽܿݐ݅ݒ݁  
 1.868*** 
(0.312) 
 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݌݈ܽ݊ݐ݈ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁ሻ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀   
   1.162 
(0.386) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ ሺ݌݈ܽ݊ݐ݈ܿ݋ݏݑݎ݁ሻ 
ൈݓ݋݉ܽ݊ݑ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀݋ݎ݅݊ܽܿݐ݅ݒ݁  
  3.505*** 
(1.433) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݀݅ݏ݉݅ݏݏ݈ܽሻ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀   
  1.556** 
(0.334) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏ ሺ݀݅ݏ݉݅ݏݏ݈ܽሻ 
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊ݑ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀݋ݎ݅݊ܽܿݐ݅ݒ݁  
  2.857*** 
(0.859) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀  
  1.299** 
(0.152) 
 ܰ݁ݓ݆݋ܾ݂ܽݐ݁ݎ݆݋ܾ݈݋ݏݏሺ݋ݐ݄݁ݎሻ  
ൈ ݓ݋݉ܽ݊ݑ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݁݀݋ݎ݅݊ܽܿݐ݅ݒ݁  
  1.615*** 
(0.298) 
     
 No. of failures 712 712 712 
 No. of couples 13,407 13,407 13,407 
 Couple-Year observations 116,069 116,069 116,069 
 Log likelihood -3,925.582 -3,928.761 -3,924.372 
 ߩ  0.206 0.153 0.192 
 LR Test of ߩ ൌ Ͳ (p-value) 0.180 0.270 0.200 
Please note: All regressions include the following variables for both men and women: age, dummies on migration background, education (in years), 
unemployment experience and the following household characteristics: household income (adjusted for number of adults and children by the OECD 
equivalence scale), dummy for house ownership, dummies for the number of children, dummy on area (rural or urban) as well as dummies for woman’s 
employment status (fulltime employed in private sector, part-time employed in private sector, fulltime self-employed, part-time self-employed, fulltime 
public service, part-time public service, in training, internship, pensioner; inactive is reference) and dummies for man’s employment status (pensioner, 
inactive, (former) self-employed). 
All regressions also include an interaction with women, that are either self-employed, in training, in internship or pensioners. ߩ is the proportion of the 
(total) variance explained by couple-specific random components. 
The baseline hazard is modelled via 42 dummies on marriage duration. A constant is not included.  
* indicates that exp(coeff) is significantly different from 1 at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
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